Article II of the U.S. Constitution is clearly crucial to establishing two fundamental institutional relationships: the president`s relationship with Congress and the president`s relationship with the rest of the executive branch, which we would now call “bureaucracy.” Despite the text`s apparent specificity on some key points — z.B the role of the president in the appointment process — the silence of the Constitution and the ambiguity of the text in other respects over the centuries have fuelled very different conceptions of the American presidency. To put it with Justice Robert Jackson, Americans might be “surprised by the poverty of a truly useful and unequivocal authority, applicable to the concrete problems of the executive branch as they actually present themselves.” Youngstown Sheet – Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Even if the decisions of the Court of Justice regarding compliance with executive agreements are not inaccurate, the practice of executive agreements must be more clearly limited. The high obstacle posed by the board and approval under a super-majority rule should prevent foreign entanglements. Therefore, purely executive agreements should only be allowed if they are slaughter agreements, such as prisoner exchanges or settlements, or if they are based exclusively on independent presidential authorities, such as the power to recognize foreign national states. See Michael B. Ramsey, The Constitution`s Text in Foreign Affairs 191-217 (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court Pink (1942) found that international agreements, which were concluded in law, have the same legal status as treaties and do not require Senate approval. To Reid v.
Concealed (1957), the Tribunal, while reaffirming the President`s ability to enter into executive agreements, found that such agreements could not be contrary to existing federal law or the Constitution. With so-called congressional executive agreements, Congress has sometimes passed laws authorizing agreements with other nations. For example, trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have often been passed by law. On the other hand, the Senate vigorously opposed when President Jimmy Carter intended to obtain approval of the legislation rather than obtain Senate approval (which would have required a two-thirds majority) for the Strategic Arms Limitations II (SALT II) treaty. Sometimes, for the essential interchangeability of treaties with so-called congressional executive agreements, it is argued that Congress has listed powers that touch on foreign policy issues, such as the power to regulate trade with foreign nations. But unlike legislation, international agreements conclude binding agreements with foreign nations that could create tangles that simple legislation does not create. Another view seemed to be the basis of the Supreme Court`s decision in the United States. Belmont,491 gives effect to Litvinov`s allocation. The opinion of Sutherland J.A.
was based on his curtiss-Wright492 opinion. A first instance would have erred in dismissing a complaint filed by the United States as an agent of the Soviet Union for certain funds formerly held by a Russian metallurgical group whose assets had been acquired by the Soviet government. The President`s act in recognizing the Soviet government and the agreements that accompany it represented an international pact that the president, as the “only body” of international relations for the United States, could enter without consulting the Senate.